The occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event D has inferential significance. We query n sources or sensors who make individual reports about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of D. Their reports are either mutually confirming or there is some pattern of conflict among them. In this paper we develop expressions termed adjusted likelihood ratios which prescribe the inferential or diagnostic impact of the joint confirming or conflicting reports from the n sources. These expressions combine information about the inferential impact of D (and its complement /)) with information about the reliability of each source. We only consider the case in which the reporting behavior of any subset of the sources is not itself an inferentially significant event. Appropriate independence and conditional independence assumptions are necessary. Our formulations of adjusted likelihood ratio are applicable to a variety of medical, legal, military, and other inferential tasks.
INTRODUCTION
In the most straightforward of probabilistic inference tasks one makes revisions of the relative ]ikeliness of two or more world states or hypotheses on the basis of the established occurrence or nonoccurrence of events having inferential impact on these hypotheses. However, in a very large I Special thanks are due Dr. Paul E. Pfeiffer and Dr. Robert M. Thrall, Mathematicalclass of real-life probabilistic inference tasks the actual occurrence or nonoccurrence of any inferential event may be conjectural. The reason is that the source or sources of information about this event may be less than perfectly reliable for any one of several reasons. Because there is often no single perfectly reliable source or sensor, two or more sources are asked to determine whether or not some inferential event has occurred. In X-ray interpretation, for example, several radiologists may be asked to determine whether or no% a given X-ray image contains a certain indication. In legal proceedings, several witnesses may be asked to testify about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some event. In intelligence analysis, more than one human source or more than one mechanical or electronic sensor may be used to determine whether or not some crucial event has occurred. The purpose of our paper is to develop formal statements which prescribe the inferential impact in the joint report, from two or more unreliable sources, about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an inferential event.
Following is a summarization of the key concepts in our formalizations. Together, these concepts constitute a description of the basic inferential problems to which our formalizations are relevant. Because we are discussing only a particular aspect of cascaded inference, our notations can be kept relatively simple. We have chosen to keep our notational scheme consistent with the one adopted in an earlier paper on the relationships between the reliability of a single source and the inferential impact of the reports made by this source (Schum and Du Charme, 1971) .
(1) Consider the single binomial event class {D, D}. Suppose we are interested in determining the occurrence or nonoccurrence of event D for the inferentiaJL purpose of revising our estimate of the relative likeliness of two other events or hypotheses H1 and H2. We assume that H1 and//2 are mutually exclusive but not necessarily exhaustive. A measure of the inferential impact of event D on H1 and//2 is provided by the likelihood ratio LD = 
P(D]H~)/P(D[H2)= Pl/P2. For event D (nonoccurrence of event D), its inferential impact is given by the likelihood ratio L~ = P(D[HI)/P(DIH2) = (1 -p~)/(1 --p2).
(2) When a particular source or sensor, in making reports about events D and/), is unreliable to any degree, a distinction must be made between the occurrence of event D and the report of the occurrence of event D. The necessity for such a distinction is discussed in a previous paper (Schum and Du Charme, 1971) . A report of the occurrence of event D is to be symbolized by D* and the report of the occurrence of event/) is to be symbolized by/)*.
(3) We will consider a general case in which n sources (or sensors) are each asked to determine which one of two events (D or/)) has occurred.
It is important to note that each source is being queried about the same SCHU1V~ AND KELLY event pair {D,/)}. We let N = { 1, 2 .... , i, . . . n} be the set of integers which identify the sources of information about the occurrence of D or Z). Thus D*~ is the report made by source i that event D occurred. Similarly, /5"~ is the report from source i that event 1) occurred. On occasion we shall refer to the class of reports R -{Rx, R2, • . . , Ri, • • • , R~,} where any R~ can be either D*~ or/)*~. The subscript attached to any report thus "indicates the source or sensor from which the report comes.
(4) We assume that no one of the n sources is perfectly reliable. That is, every source has, on previous occasions, reported D* when event/3 actually occurred and has reported/5" when event D actually occurred. Specification of source reliability involves the following conditional probabilities which, for later convenience, are given labels which arise in signal detectability theory. The four conditional probabilities for any source i are:
Our assumption about imperfect source reliability means that h~ ~ 1.0 and that c~ ~ 1.0, for every source i. For reasons which will become apparent when we discuss all-important independence considerations, the best indications of "reliability" for source i are provided by the ratios hi/fi and c~/mi. There is a final consideration about source reliability. In some eases a given source might express the extent of his own uncertainty about the occurrence of events D and Z3. Fox" example, he might say that he is 60% sure that D occurred and 40% sure that D occurred. The formalizations we develop do not consider this type of reporting (see Gettys and Willke, 1969) . We are concerned instead with instances in which every source unequivocally reports D* or Z)*. The uncertainty about the actual occurrence of events D or/) must be estimated or expressed on the basis of a source's previous reporting accuracy. The four conditional probabilities listed above are formally required for this purpose.
(5) When a source of information about D or/) is less than completely reliable, an inference about the relative likeliness of H1 and H2 should be based upon reports D* or /)* having adjusted likelihood ratios A~. = P(D*IH1)/P(D*IH @ and h~,---P(D*]HO/P(f)*IH@. In their expanded form these "adjusted likelihood ratios" combine information about source reliability (expressed by h~/f, and ci/m~) with information about the impact of the event being reported (expressed by the values p~ and P2).
(6) A crucial factor in our formalizations is the particular pattern of reports made by the n sources about events D and/). First, suppose that all n sources make the same report (i.e., they all make reports D* or they all make reports/3*). We shall call this the confirming case since all sources are consistent in making the same report. In the second case, suppose that r >_ 1 of the sources make reports D* but the remaining in -r) sources make reports/3'*. This case will be called the conflicting case. In the present paper we develop formal statements which prescribe the inferential or diagnostic impact in the joint report, from two or more sources, of events in the class {D,/3}. We consider both the confirming and conflicting cases. Each of the statements we develop is in the form of an adjusted likelihood ratio (A). A value of A will combine information about the reliability of each source with information about the inferential impact of events in the class {D,/3}.
MAJOR INDEPENDENCE ISSUES
We begin by considering ways of characterizing the individual and the joint behavior of sources or sensors making repol'ts D* or D*. The concepts of independence and conditional independence are crucial in these considerations. We recall that events A and B are said to be (stochastically) independent iff (if and only if) P(AB) = P(A)P(B). If this relationship holds, then P(A IB) =: P(A) and P(BIA ) = P(B). In this case it is frequently said that A and B a~re totally independent. Events A and B are said t;o be conditionally independent, given another event C, iff P
(ABIC ) = P(AIC)P(BtC ).
It can easily be demonstrated that conditional independence of A and B (given C) does not imply total independence of A and B nor does total independence imply conditional independence. Our present problem of determining the iI~ferential impact of a joint report from unreliable sources will be a prime example showing the absolute necessity of making careful and separate independence assumptions about various aspects of source bghavior. Indeed, lack of precision in stating the independence conditions we wish to assume will lead us to conclusions about adjusted likelihood ratio whose consequences are not at all congenial to intuition in a variety of conditions. There is a large class of independence issues of concern in cascaded inference (Schum and Du Charme, 1971) . We now list two independence issues of importance in describing the individual and joint behavior of our reporting sources. Independence issues crucial in other stages of cascaded inference are discussed in a later section.
Report and Event Nonindependence
Our first formal requirement is that the individual reports from each source actually convey information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of event D. This requirement can be expressed as an assumption about the total nonindependence of reports (D*) and events (D). n}. We assume that the class {D*~, D} is not an independent class for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We note that this assumption implies that the class {D'i, /)} is also not an independent class for any i= 1,2, . . . ,n. Statistical independence can be interpreted as a failure of conditioning of one event by another (Pfeiffer and Schum, 1973) . Assumption 1 simply states that reports from any single source are conditional upon the events being reported; that is, P(D*ilD) ~ P(D*) and P(/)*~I/)) # P(D*). An easily verified implication of Assumption 1 is that P(D*~ID ) = hi ~ fi = P(D*ilD), and that P(/)*il/)) = ci ~ mi = P(D*IID). It has been shown that, with the exception of certain unusual cases discussed elsewhere, the condition hi = f~ (implying ci = mi) for any source i causes a total destruction of the inferential impact of reports from this source (Schum and Du Charme, 1971) . It can be argued, therefore, that the condition h~/fi = 1.0 might best be taken as the condition of zero reliability for source i.
In our formalizations of adjusted likelihood ratio (h) in both cases we will assume that hi > fi (which implies that c~ > m~). The reason for this assumption is that hl > f~ means that the report D* will favor inferentially the same hypothesis that event D favors (the same can be said about/)* and/)). If hl < fi (or ci < ml) a condition called an impact reversal occurs, In an impact reversal a source report favors one hypothesis while the event being reported favors another hypothesis. We simply wish to exclude these possible impact reversals in our developments. It does seem likely that few real-life inference systems would employ sources whose hit rates might be smaller than their false-alarm rates. Impact reversals are possible b~t seem pathological or unlikely in most inferential activity.
Source Behavior, by Itself, Has No Inferential Significance
Our second assumption is more subtle than the first and it requires careful statement. We wish to consider situations in which all of the inferential impact upon HI and H2 resides in the events {D, /)} being reported upon and not in the individual or joint behavior of the sources or sensors making reports about D and D. The expressions we develop for A will tell us how much of the total impact in events D and b [expressed by LD --'--Pl/P2 and L~ = (1 -pl)/(1 -p~)] we should incorporate in our inferences about the relative likeliness of H1 and H2. Exactly how much of this total impact we can incorporate will depend upon the reliability of the sources making reports D* and D*. When source behavior, by itself, has no inferential significance we can expect expressions for A to be appro-priately bounded by LD and Ls in both the confirming and conflicting cases.
There are two varieties of source behavior we wish to rule out. A single appropriate conditional independence assumption will allow us to make these exclusions. First, we wish to specify that the reporting behavior of any subset of sources (including single-member subsets) is not contingent upon any hypothesis about which inferences are being made. For example, we exclude possible instances in which a radiologist's hit or false-alarm rate might depend upon what illness (Hi) a patient has. Second, we will require the source reports to be mutually independent given event D and given event/). As an example, suppose five radiologists read and interpret X-ray images for us. We will require that the reporting behavior of any subset (single-member subsets included) of the radiologists is not contingent upon the reporting behavior of any other subset, both when event D is true and when event/5 is true. The reason for requiring mutual source independence given D and given JO is that, by Assumptio~a 1, the reports from each individual source are to be conditional upon D and/).
It may appear that we must make two separate assumptions. However, the following statement incorporates both exclusions we wish to make. for some subset of the R~. When this is true, it can easily be deduced that
P(H~I 55 R~ ~, D) ¢ P(Hk[D).
In words, this inequality means that there i is inferential impact on H~ of the ioint report ((h Ri) in excess of the i impact in the event D being reported. As mentioned above, in our formalizations of adjusted likelihood ratio we wish to exclude instances in which the reporting behavior of one or more of the sources is actually an event itself having inferential significance regarding H~ and//2. Reporting behavior as an inferential event is a problem which appears to be of some importance in certain inferential systems and it is briefly discussed for single sources in Sehum and Du Charme (1971) . The second provision is expressed by the product rule for conditional probabilities in each of the above equality expressions. These product rules embody the assumption of source mutual independence, given D and given/). To illustrate consequences of the failure of this assumption, 3 3
consider three sources i = 1, 2, 3, and suppose P(
One particular instance in which this product rule may fail to hold is the
In other words, the hit rate for Source 3 is influenced by reports R, and R2 from Sources 1 and 2 in this case. It is this sort of mutual influence among the sources that we wish to exclude.
Finally, we note that Assumption 2 does not imply the complete or unconditional independence of the Re. In other words, we cannot deduce from Assumption 2 that P(~ Re) = ~ P(R¢), for any subset of the R~. This is i i not crucial in our development of A because, under Assumption 1, we suppose that every R~ is conditioned by D and/).
ADJUSTED LIKELIHOOD RATIO: CONFIRMING CASE
We first consider the case in which there is complete reporting agreement among the n sources. All n sources report the same condition, i.e., every Re = D*e or every R~ = /)*e. We recall our initial provision that, for any source i, he ~ 1.0 and ce ~ 1.0. Our task is to find expressions which prescribe the inferential impact, on the mutually exclusive hypotheses H1 and //2, of the joint confirming reports from the n sources. We begin with the following definition. Definition 1. Suppose Re = D'i, for every source i. The inferential impact on H1 and H~ of these n confirming reports is prescribed by the adjusted likelihood ratio
A[n(D*)] = P [i=~ D*e]HI] / P [~=~-~I D*eIH2 ].
If R~ =/)*e, for every source i, the inferential impact on H1 and H= of these confirming reports is prescribed by the adjusted likelihood ratio 
P(F ~ Hk) = P(F ~ D ~ Hk) ÷ P(F ~ D ~ Hk) = P(F]D ~ H~)P(DIHk)P(H~ ) + P(FID ~ Hk)P(DIHk)P(Hk ).
Then, by defimtion,
P(F1Hk ) = P(FID (-~ H~)P(DiHk) + P(FID ~ Hk)P(DIHk).
Under Assumption 2 we can write: P
(FIHk ) = P(FID)P(DIH~ ) -t-P(FID) P(DIH~ ). Also under Assumption 2, P(FID ) = [~ P(D*~ID ) and P(FID )
This development holds for any/~, so we can write:
Various alternative forms of Eq.
(1) will prove useful. We recall that P(D*~]D) = hi (the "hit" rate for source i) and that P(D*ilD) = f~ (the "false alarm" rate for source i). We let A~ = hi/f~ be the hit rate relative to the false-alarm rate for source i. Also, let Pl = P(DIHI) and p2 = P(DIH~), P(DIHI ) = 1 -pi, and P(DIH2 ) = 1 -p2. p~+ a n provided that 1] A~ ~ 1. In all discussions of A[n(D*)] we assume that i=1 hs > fs for any source i (i.e., A~ > 1, all i). In Eq. (lc) this means that 0<a<~.
Using the same development and assumptions we can express A[n(Jg*)]
as:
[i=fI p(b, lD) ] p(DlH~) + [~=~l P(D, [D) ] P(D[H~)
We recall that P(D*s[D) = c~ (the"correct" rejection rate for source i) and that P(/)*~]D) = m~ (the "miss" rate for source i). We let B~ = ci/mi indicate the correct rejection rate relative to the miss rate for source i. Then, alternatively,
where
provided that H Bi ¢ 1. The previous requirement h~ > f~ implies that i=l cl > ms (i.e., Bs > 1, for every i). This means that --~ < ¢~ < --1 in Eq. (2b). We recall that the reason for requiring As > 1 (all i) in A[n(D*)] and B~ > 1 (all i) in A[n(/)*)] is to rule out "pathological" instances in which an event points inferentially to one hypothesis but the report of this event points inferentially to the other hypothesis. Any source whose hit rate is less than its false alarm rate can cause "impact reversals" of the sort mentioned previously.
Discussion of the Confirming Case
In the follo~4ng comments we describe various properties of adjusted likelihood ratio in the confirming case. The first comment should assist the reader in determining why special care in making assumptions about independence and conditional independence was necessary. We now ask why we should expect these particular bounds on adjusted likelihood ratio in the confirming case given our assumptions. Suppose the n sources (each one not completely reliable) agree and make reports D*. These n confirming reports all refer to the occurrence of the same event D. If D actually occurred, its total inferential impact on H~ and H2 is indicated by the ratio pi/p2. Now, our Assumption 2, that reporting behavior given D and D is not contingent upon any H~, rules out instances in which adjusted likelihood ratio could, legitimately, provide impact over and above the impact of event D. Recall the example showing that, when any R~ is conditioned by any Hk, the reporting behavior of the sources has inferential significance itself. We are requiring also that the joint confirming report should provide no inferential impact in excess of the impact of event D. We wish our models to reflect the fact that all n reports refer to the same event and that no report or subset of reports contain inferentiM information not already contained in event D. The model for A(n(D*)] shown above is consistent in this respect. A[n(D*)] prescribes how much of the total impact of event D (on H~ and H2) we should apply in revising our opinions about the relative likeliness of H~ and H~ on the basis of the joint confirming report. How much of this total impact we can apply depends upon the reliability of the sources.
Limiting Values of

SC~IVM AND KnLLY
Now, with only slight modification, we could have stated Assumption 2 in a manner which leads to entirely different consequences in both the confirming and conflicting cases. Suppose we had simply required that the report class R = {R1, R2 .... , R~} be independent conditional upon H~, for k = 1, 2. Under this assumption we can write, for the case in which all sources report D*,
where AD,~ is the adjusted likelihood ratio for the report D* from the single source i. The alternative assumption stated in the previous paragraph does not imply the requirement in our original Assumption 2 that the R~ be mutually independent given D and given D, under hi and//2. Thus, our Assumption 2 also rules out instances in which there may be inferential impact in the joint reporting behavior of the sources which is not due to the influence of H1 or//2. The assumption leading to the condition A[n(D*)] = ~ AD.~ i=1 fails to rule out this possible additional impact and so we expect that adjusted likelihood ratio would not be bounded by the total impact of events {D,
Contingency of A[n(D*)] and A[n(/))*] upon Specific Values of pl and p2
Equations ( probable than event D1 under H1 and H2. For every a > 0, the inferential impact in the ioint report of D2 is less than the impact in the joint report of D1. In general, the more improbable an event is under H1 and//2 the more seriously degraded is the inferential impact in reports of this event by sources having some fixed level of unreliability.
Adding Additional Reporting Sources
We can consider the n sources to be a reporting or detection "system." 
A(I,J) = [[1 P(D*~ID) P(D*ilD) [ H P(D*~[D)
P(D*~]/))
P(DIHx)+[.~j P(D*~ID) ] P(D]H1)
P(D]H2) + P(D%ID) P(b]H~)
With notational conventions already established we can write:
In the interests of further simplification we let A~ = [I Ai and Bj = 1] Bj. That is, A~ is the combined hit rate relative to false alarm rate for jEJ all r sources reporting D* and Bj is the combined correct rejection rate relative to miss rate for all (n --r) sources reporting D*. Thus, 
Inferential Direction and Strength of A(I, J).
Using Eq. (3d) we can establish boundary conditions for A(I, J). If we fix Bj and let A± increase without limit, 7 approaches zero and A([, J) approaches p~/p2. Fixing AI and letting Bj increase without limit makes ~, approach the value --1 and A(I, J) approach the ratio (1 -pl)/(1 --p2). When p~ > p2, then (1 -p~)/(1 -p2) < A(I, J) < pl/p2; when pl < p2, then p~/p2 < A(I, J) < (1 -pl)/(1 -p2). Thus, subject to the assumptions made at the outset, the inferential impact of the joint conflicting report is bounded by the impact of event D (prescribed by p~/p2) and the impaet of/) (prescribed by (1 -pl)/(1 -p2)).
We must now consider the problem of finding the inferential direction of a joint conflicting report. By specifying the inferential "direction" of any report we simply mean specifying the hypothesis (H~ or H2) under which the report is most likely. We say a report "points toward" or "favors" the hypothesis under which the report is most likely. The inferential direction of a joint conflicting report depends upon A± and Bj as well as upon p~ and p2. We first note, using Eq. (3e), that when A1 = B j, then A(I, J) = 1 regardless of the value of p~ and p2. Thus, a ioint conflicting report has no inferential impact when A~ = Bj. Now, when A1 > Bj, the joint conflicting report will favor whichever hypothesis event D favors. (Recall that the r sources, Mth combined hit rate relative to false alarm rate AI, all reported the occurrence of event D.) When A± < B j, then the joint conflicting report will favor whichever hypothesis event/) favors. (The n -r sources, with combined correct reiection rate to miss rate B], all reported the occurrence of event /).) From Eq. 
"Majority Rule" by Itself is Inappropriate as an Indication of Inferential Direction in the Conflicting Case
Equation ( rather than the numbers of members r in I and n -r in J. One can easily show that r > n -r does not imply A~ > B], and, that r < n -r does not imply Az < Bj. The result is that one should "side" inferentially with the majority report iff the joint reliability of the majority sources exceeds the joint reliability of the sources in the minority. Thus, source reliability is more important than the extent of source agreement in our assessment of the inferential strength and direction of conflicting reports. This means that the practice of using an odd number of sources to resolve potential reporting conflicts ignores what is crucial; namely, source reliability. It also means that some thought should be given, in civil judicial proceedings, about whether or not the concept of "preponderance of evidence" is interpreted correctly. The number of witnesses testifying is not as crucial as their reliabilities. . These values occur when ~, <_ -1 (i.e., when AI < B j). A representation'such as Figure 2 can be used to find the change in inferential strength and direction of a joint conflicting report when additional sources, each with known values of A~ or Bj, are added. We note that in the conflicting ease, as well as in the confirming case, that A depends upon p, and p2 rather than upon the ratio of these values.
An Example of Impact Determination in the Conflicting Case
OTHER CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE ISSUES
Independence issues arise, other than those previously mentioned, when we attempt to evaluate a current joint report in the light of previous evidence. In most inference situations one's evidence or knowledge, prior to the acquisition of a current repol~t or observation, consists of a melange of verified and unverified reports. Our task is to determine the extent to which any of this prior knowledge should further condition the information we are now using to assess the impact of our current joint report. The models for adjusted likelihood ratio in both the confirming and conflicting cases make it clear that we need two classes of information in order to assess the inferential impact of a joint report. The first ldnd of information concerns the inferential impact of the event being reported. This impact is specified by the values pl and p2. The second type of information concerns the reliability of the sources or observers making reports about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the current event of concern. The reliability of a source is indicated by its hit and false-alarm rates. Our specific concern is with cases in which values indicating event impact and source reliability have some prebabilistic linkage with prior evidence. The following comments are intended merely to alert the reader to the conditional independence issues involved.
Let T represent the class of all relevant events Et known to have occurred prior to a current joint report. Let U represent the class of relevant unverified reports R~ from sources with less than perfect reliability. By relevant we mean that these events and reports have impact on inferences involving two disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2. We let S represent our entire set of prior evidence, where Suppose the class {Dy, I3y} includes a current event and its complement, and the class {D*~,,/3"~,} consists of reports of either of these two current events made by source i (whose reliability is less than perfect). Further, suppose that we have n _> 1 reports of events {Dy, /3y} and we wish to determine adjusted likelihood ratio A in either the conflicting or confirming cases. We note that when n = 1 we have, trivially, the confirming ease.
In addition to the independence and conditional independence issues mentioned at the outset of this paper we have the following three considerations involving conditional independence.
(1) In evaluating the inferential impact of events Dy and L3y we must ask whether or not any subset of the prior evidence in set S would condition D~ and/3~ under any hypothesis Hk. Let s be any subset of events or reports in S. Taking Dy, for example, if P(Dv]Hk ('h s) = P(DylI-Ik ) for every s C S, then the impact of Dy on Hk is not conditioned by prior evidence. That is, Dy and S are conditionally independent given Hk. If there is some s for which P(D,,IHk ~ s) ~ P(D~IH~), then Dy and s are nonindependent conditional upon Hk. The problem of coping with conditional nonindependence among events has been discussed previously (Edwards, 1963; Schum, 1966; Schum, 1969; Sehum, Southard, and Wombolt, 1969) . Possible conditional nonindependence involving a current event and an unverified report (or reports) involves complexities that, to the authors' knowledge, have not yet been treated systematically. This problem seems worthy of consideration, however, since it is easy to imagine many instances in which one or more items of unverified prior evidence may condition a current event being evaluated. D i from source i must be condi-(2) We noted that reports D*i and -* tioned by events D and/) otherwise these reports from this source can have no inferential impact. Our development of A in the confirming and conflicting cases assumed that hi = P(D*ilD) and ci = P(D i[D), for any source i, were not conditioned by any hypothesis Hk. There may be instances in which one may be advised to evaluate h~ and cl for current reports D*,, and/)*~, in the light of some subset s of prior evidence. There appear to be two conditional independence issues. P(D ~JD~ s)= P(D*~ID~) for every s C S means that ci (correct rejection rate on/)*~ for source i) is not conditioned by (i.e., is independent of) prior evidence. Coping with this conditional independence issue involves an examination of prior evidence to see whether or not there are previous inferentially relevant events or reports which would cause us to revise our estimates of the reliability parameters for any source making a current report.
(b) There may be instances in which the joint consideration of some hypothesis Hk and a subset s of prior evidence may cause us to revise our estimates of the reliability parameters for some source making a current D.
-, -
report. Formally, if P(D*y~IDy ~ s ~ H~) = P( ~ID,), and if P(D ~lDy
s ~ Hk) = P(/)*~j/)~) for every s C S and for every H~, then hi and cl for current reports D*y¢ and -* D y~ are conditionally independent of the joint occurrence of any subset of prior evidence under every hypothesis. We note that conditional independence involving s or Hk by themselves does not imply conditional independence involving the joint consideration of s and Hk.
(3) In our discussions of A in the confirming and conflicting eases we assumed that the reports about the occurrence of D and/3 from n >_ 2 sources were mutually independent given D and/). That is, the sources neither decide among themselves what to report nor does any single source make his report contingent upon what other sources report. We can conceive of instances in which the joint reporting behavior of n ~ 2 sources may be conditioned by some s, some H~, or by the joint consideration of some s and Hk.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed multisource A for the ease in which values of A are bounded by the inferential impact of events D or/) being reported by the sources. These bounds on A occur subject to the independence and conditional independence assumptions mentioned at the outset. The reader has surely noticed that there is a standard form of A which appears in every case. This standard form is:
A = (pl + vk)/(p2 + vk). (4)
In this standard form of A, vk is a source reliability parameter whose value in special case k depends upon the number of sources, their individual values of At and Bj, and the pattern of reports made. We derived statements which prescribe the inferential impact in a joint confirming or conflicting report from n sources, each with less than perfect reporting accuracy. Our use of the term "joint" report may not be completely desirable since it may suggest that all n reports must be available simultaneously. Using Eq. (4) and the v~ shown in Table 1 we can easily see how the inferential impact in any n reports can be assessed sequentially over time. We have already seen one example of this process in the diseussion of "adding additional sources" in the confirming ease. First suppose that a single source, whose hit and false-alarm rates are known to us, reports D*. We can calculate A using Eq. (4) with parameter vl. Some time later, two other sources with known hit and fMse-Marm rates also report D*. We can revise A using Eq. (4) and v3 with n = 3 since the three sources are confirming about the occurrence of event D. Now suppose that a fourth source with known correct rejection and miss rates reports ])*. We revise A using Eq. (4) and v5 with I --3 and J = 1, since the fourth source conflicts with the other three. Adding any number of other sources merely requires a change in the value of parameter vs.
Our representation for A in the confirming and conflicting cases has greater generality than might be supposed from our developments thus far. We have only been concerned thus far with inferences involving two disjoint hypotheses H1 and H~. Now suppose that our inferences concern a disjoint class {HI, H2, . . 
